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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
II. EVIDENCE
A. General Admissibility
The case of State v. Derr6 presented Justice Cleckley with an opportunity
to clarify the admissibility of evidence under Rules 401-403 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence. The decision in Derr made emphatically clear that "[t]he West
Virginia Rules of Evidence remain the paramount authority in determining the
admissibility of evidence in circuit courts. These rules constitute more than a mere
refinement of common law evidentiary rules, they are a comprehensive
reformulation of them."7 Justice Cleckley set out a bright line in Derr for
understanding the relationship between Rules 401-403. The opinion held,
[a]lthough Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence strongly encourage the admission of as much evidence as
possible, Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence restricts
this liberal policy by requiring a balancing of interests to determine
whether logically relevant is legally relevant evidence.
Specifically, Rule 403 provides that although relevant, evidence
may nevertheless be excluded when the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion, or undue delay is disproportionate to the value of the
evidence.8
With a clear line of responsibility assigned to Rules 401-403, Justice Cleckley
pressed forward to overrule prior precedent inconsistent with Derr's interpretation
of the responsibility assigned to Rule 403:
Whatever the wisdom and utility of State v. Rowe, and its progeny,
it is clear that the Rowe balancing test did not survive the adoption
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Therefore, State v. Rowe,
supra, is expressly overruled because it is manifestly incompatible
with Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.9
6 451 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1994).
7 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
8 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 6 (citation omitted).
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The case of Michael ex rel. Estate of Michael v. Sabado0 provided an
opportunity for further comment on Rule 403. The opinion held that
Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is explicit in the
discretion granted a trial judge to admit or exclude contradictions
found to be "relevant" under Rule 401. Many of the evils that Rule
403 is designed to avoid are similar to those sought to be avoided
by the exclusion of extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter to
impeach credibility. These evils include confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, and waste of time."
The case of State v. LaRock2 provided the following guidelines on the issue
of prejudice to a criminal defendant from the admission of evidence:
It is presumed a defendant is protected from undue prejudice if the
following requirements are met: (1) the prosecution offered the
evidence for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence was relevant; (3)
the trial court made an on-the-record determination under Rule 403
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence that the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice; and (4) the trial court gave a limiting
instruction. 3
B. Admission of Photographs
The decision in State v. Derr4 confronted the admissibility of gruesome
photographs. Derr held that "[t]he admissibility of photographs over a gruesome
objection must be determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to Rules 401 through
403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence."' 5 The opinion then laid out the steps
trial courts must follow when assessing the admissibility of photographs over an
10 453 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1994).
11 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
12 470 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1996).
13 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
14 451 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1994).
15 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
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asserted gruesome objection:
Rule 401 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence requires the trial
court to determine the relevancy of the exhibit on the basis of
whether the photograph is probative as to a fact of consequence in
the case. The trial court then must consider whether the probative
value of the exhibit is substantially outweighed by the
counterfactors listed in Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence. As to the balancing under Rule 403, the trial court
enjoys broad discretion. The Rule 403 balancing test is essentially
a matter of trial conduct, and the trial court's discretion will not be
overturned absent a showing of clear abuse. 6
C. Admissibility Under Rule 404(b)
In State v. McGinnis7 Justice Cleckley expounded upon the admissibility
of evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules ofEvidence. The opinion
addressed the issue generally and then established a specific standard for evaluating
a proffer of evidence under Rule 404(b). As to the opinion's general statement on
the issue, Justice Cleckley wrote,
[w]hen offering evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence, the prosecution is required to identify the
specific purpose for which the evidence is being offered and the
jury must be instructed to limit its consideration of the evidence to
only that purpose. It is not sufficient for the prosecution or the trial
court merely to cite or mention the litany of possible uses listed in
Rule 404(b). The specific and precise purpose for which the
evidence is offered must clearly be shown from the record and that
purpose alone must be told to the jury in the trial court's
instruction."
The opinion then turned to specific guidelines to which trial courts must adhere
when ruling upon a Rule 404(b) proffer of evidence. In astute fashion, Justice
Cleckley held,
16 Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.
17 455 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1994).
18 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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[w]here an offer of evidence is made under Rule 404(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule
104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, is to determine its
admissibility. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should
conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State v. Dolin. After
hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court must
be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or
conduct occurred and that the defendant committed the acts. If the
trial court does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the acts or conduct was committed or that the defendant was the
actor, the evidence should be excluded under Rule 404(b). If a
sufficient showing has been made, the trial court must then
determine the relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing
required under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.
If the trial court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b) evidence is
admissible, it should instruct the jury on the limited purpose for
which such evidence has been admitted. A limiting instruction
should be given at the time the evidence is offered, and we
recommend that it be repeated in the trial court's general charge to
the jury at the conclusion of the evidence."'
D. Expert Testimony
In MildredL.M. v. John O.F,.2° Justice Cleckley clarified ajury's role in
rejecting uncontradicted expert testimony. The opinion held that
[a]lthough a jury is not bound to accept expert testimony and
should evaluate an expert witness as it would any other witness,
the jury is not free to reject uncontradicted scientific testimony and
to substitute its own speculation in its place. In cases where expert
testimony is uncontradicted and the jury rejects it, there must be
ample other testimony reasonably supporting the jury's verdict.2
19 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (citation omitted).
20 452 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1994).
21 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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In Gentry v. Mangum.' Justice Cleckley set out guidelines for trial courts
when determining whether a witness is an expert. The opinion held,
[i]n determining who is an expert, a circuit court should conduct a
two-step inquiry. First, a circuit court must determine whether the
proposed expert (a) meets the minimal educational or experiential
qualifications (b) in a field that is relevant to the subject under
investigation (c) which will assist the trier of fact. Second, a
circuit court must determine that the expert's area of expertise
covers the particular opinion as to which the expert seeks to
testify.2
E. Admissibility of flegal Recording
Justice Cleckley succinctly held in West Virginia Department ofHealth and
Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. David L.24 that "[a]ny recordings of
conversations made in violation of W. Va. Code, 62-1D-3(a)(1) (1987), and 18
U.S.C. 251 l(1)(a) (1988) are inadmissible under W. Va. Code, 62-1D-6 (1987),
and 18 U.S.C. 2515 (1968)."'
F. Rebuttal Evidence
Justice Cleckley addressed the admission of rebuttal evidence in the case
of Michael ex rel. Estate ofMichael v. Sabado.26 The opinion held that "[a]llowance
of a party to present additional evidence on rebuttal depends upon the circumstances
of the case and rests within the discretion of the individual most able to weigh the
competing interests and circumstances - the trial judge.' 27
22 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
23 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
24 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994).
25 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
26 453 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1994).
27 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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G. Impeachment
InMcDougal v. McCammon,28 Justice Cleckley wrote that "[s]ubject to well
established exceptions, impeachment by contradiction may properly attack all kinds
of testimony, whether given on direct or on cross, and indeed all evidence, as well
as inferences suggested by evidence or arguments of counsel interpreting the
evidence."'29
The issue of impeachment, specifically under Rule 608(a), was addressed
in State v. Roy.3" Writing in Roy, Justice Cleckley stated,
[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to certain
limitations. The evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. A fair reading of Rule 608(a) of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides that a witness may be
impeached by proof that the witness is untruthful. Under this rule,
no distinction is made between nonparty witnesses and party
witnesses. The rule applies with equal force to the defendant in a
criminal case. The form of proof may be either "reputation" or
"opinion" evidence."
The decision in Roy also looked at the use of Rule 608 to impeach a
defendant who testifies. Justice Cleckley ruled on this issue by holding,
[u]nlike Rule 404(a)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,
under Rule 608, a witness's character for truthfulness is placed in
issue once the witness testifies. No more is required. The accused,
by testifying, becomes subject to an attack on his credibility. In
this regard, he is treated like any other witness; therefore, his
credibility is placed in issue even though he should offer no direct
testimony concerning his good reputation for truthfulness or
concerning a character trait otherwise at issue.3"
28 455 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 1995).
29 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
30 460 S.E.2d 277 (1995).
31 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
32 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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In State v. Blake,33 the court held that "[g]enerally, a witness who testifies
to certain matters cannot be impeached by showing his or her failure on a prior
occasion to disclose a material fact unless the disclosure was omitted under
circumstances rendering it incumbent or natural for the witness to state it.' '34 Blake
continued by holding,
[w]hen a prior inconsistent statement is offered to impeach a
witness and the claimed inconsistency rests on an omission to state
previously a fact now asserted, the prior statement is admissible if
it also can be shown that prior circumstances were such that the
witness could have been expected to state the omitted fact, either
because he or she was asked specifically about it or because the
witness was then purporting to render a full and complete account
of the accident, transaction, or occurrence and the omitted fact was




[t]hree requirements must be satisfied before admission at trial of
a prior inconsistent statement allegedly made by a witness: (1) The
statement actually must be inconsistent, but there is no requirement
that the statement be diametrically opposed; (2) if the statement
comes in the' form of extrinsic evidence as opposed to oral
cross-examination of the witness to be impeached, the area of
impeachment must pertain to a matter of sufficient relevancy and
the explicit requirements of Rule 613(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence - notice and an opportunity to explain or deny
- must be met; and, finally, (3) the jury must be instructed that the
evidence is admissible only to impeach the witness and not as
evidence of a material fact.
36
33 478 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1996).
34 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
35 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
36 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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Justice Cleckley ruled in State v. Crabtree' that "[a] statement or conduct
by a declarant that is inconsistent with his or her hearsay statement that is admitted
pursuant to Rule 806 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is not subject to the
traditional requirement of affording the declarant an opportunity to explain or deny
the inconsistency. '
H. Extrajudicial Inculpatory Statements
In State v. Bradshaw,39 Justice Cleckley confronted the admission into
evidence of extrajudicial inculpatory statements by a defendant. The opinion held
that "[t]he burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
extrajudicial inculpatory statements were made voluntarily before the statements
can be admitted into evidence against one charged with or suspected of the
commission of a crime."'4 The decision also stated "[w]hether an extrajudicial
inculpatory statement is voluntary or the result of coercive police activity is a legal
question to be determined from a review of the totality of the circumstances."41
L Communication Privileges
Justice Cleckley thoroughly addressed spousal communication privileges
in State v. Bradshaw.42 The opinion noted at the outset that
West Virginia recognizes two marital privileges: the spousal
testimony privilege and the marital confidence privilege. The two
are distinct and must be analyzed separately. The spousal
testimony privilege is much broader than the marital confidence
privilege in that it bars all adverse testimony; whereas, the marital
confidence privilege applies only to confidential communications
and can be asserted even after the dissolution of the marriage. On
the other hand, the spousal testimony privilege is narrower than the
37 482 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1996).
38 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
39 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1995).
40 Id. at SylPt. 1.
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marital confidence privilege in that it applies only to criminal
proceedings and can be asserted only during the marriage.43
The decision illustrated that "[t]he marital confidence privilege applies only to
communications that are confidential. Communications made in the presence of
known third parties or intended.to be disclosed to others are outside the privilege."
Finally, Justice Cleckley held that
W. Va. Code, 57-3-3 (1923), absolutely prohibits the spouse of a
criminal defendant from testifying against the defendant, except
where the defendant is charged with a crime against the person or
property of the other spouse or certain other relatives. Where
properly invoked, this statute precludes all adverse testimony by a
spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential communications.
This spousal protection applies only to legally recognized
marriages and lasts only as long as the legal marriage exists.
45
The case of State ex reL Doe v. Troisi46 permitted Justice Cleckley to
comment on the attorney-client communication privilege. The opinion held that
[a]s a general rule, the attorney-client privilege is adequate
protection of client confidences even in the context of a grand jury
proceeding. There is no need to quash a grand jury subpoena
simply because it is issued to an attorney of an individual under
investigation. Once properly invoked, the circuit court has
discretion to decide on a question-by-question basis whether the
privilege was properly asserted during the grand jury
proceedings.47
The attorney-client privilege was again addressed in State ex rel. U.S.
43 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
44 Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.
45 Bradshaw, 457 S.E.2d at 461 Syl. Pt. 11.
46 459 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1995).
47 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Canady8 In that case the court held: "[a] party may
waive the attorney-client privilege by asserting claims or defenses that put his or her
attorney's advice in issue.""9 Justice Cleckley wrote that "[t]he burden of
establishing the attorney-client privilege or the work product exception, in all their
elements, always rests upon the person asserting it."50
The decision in US. Fidelity held that "[u]nless obviously correct or
unreviewably discretionary, rulings requiring attorneys to turn over documents that
are presumably prepared for their clients' information and future action are
presumptively erroneous."' The opinion also ruled that "[w]hen a circuit court's
discovery ruling with respect to privileged materials will result in the compelled
disclosure of those materials, a hard and more stringent examination will be given
on appeal to determine if the circuit court abused its discretion."52
The attorney work product privilege was also addressed in US. Fidelity.
Justice Cleckley took the opportunity in that opinion to clarify what person holds
the privilege under the attorney work product privilege. Justice Cleckley opined
that "[w]here the work product exception is asserted, a circuit court must consider
that the protection stemming from this privilege belongs to the professional, rather
than the client, and that efforts to obtain disclosure of opinion work product should
be evaluated with particular care."'53
The priest-penitent privilege was outlined in State v. Potter 4 Justice
Cleckley wrote:
A communication will be privileged, in accordance with W. Va.
Code, 57-3-9 (1992), if four tests are met: (1) the communication
must be made to a clergyman; (2) the communication may be in the
form of a confidential confession or a communication; (3) the
confession or communication must be made to the clergyman in his
professional capacity; and (4) the communication must have been
48 460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 1995).
49 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
50 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
51 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
52 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
53 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
54 478 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1996).
Special]
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made in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice
of the clergyman's denomination.5
J. Demonstrative Evidence
Admission of demonstrative evidence was commented upon in State v.
Bradshaw.56 In Bradshaw, the court ruled "[t]he admission of demonstrative
evidence rests largely within the trial court's discretion, and an appellate court will
not interfere unless the trial court has abused that discretion. More specifically,
demonstrative evidence in the nature of witness reenactment is admissible if it
affords a reasonable inference on a point in issue."'"7
K Admissibility Under Rule 804(b) (3)
The case of State v. Mason" provided Justice Cleckley with an opportunity
to delineate guidelines for admitting hearsay evidence under Rule 804(b)(3). The
opinion held,
[t]o satisfy the admissibility requirements under Rule 804(b)(3) of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, a trial court must determine:
(a) The existence of each separate statement in the narrative; (b)
whether each statement was against the penal interest of the
declarant; (c) whether corroborating circumstances exist indicating
the trustworthiness of the statement; and (d) whether the declarant
is unavailable. 9
Mason went further by holding,
[w]hen ruling upon the admission of a narrative under Rule
804(b)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, a trial court
must break the narrative down and determine the separate
admissibility of each single declaration or remark. This exercise
55 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
56 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1995).
57 Id. at Syl. Pt. 14.
58 460 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1995).
59 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
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is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires careful examination of all
the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved.'
L. Admissibility under Rule 803
The case of State v. Phillips' addressed several issues involving the hearsay
exceptions contained in Rule 803. Regarding the present sense impression
exception to Rule 803, Justice Cleckley wrote,
[i]t is within a trial court's discretion to admit an out-of-court
statement under Rule 803(1), the present sense impression
exception, of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence if: (1) The
statement was made at the time or shortly after an event; (2) the
statement describes the event; and (3) the event giving rise to the
statement was within a declarant's personal knowledge.62
The opinion illustrated that "[a]lthough a trial court may consider corroborating
evidence in determining whether a statement meets the prerequisites of Rule 803(1)
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, a separate showing of trustworthiness is not
required for a statement to qualify under this hearsay exception."'63
The decision in Phillips also discussed the state-of-mind exception under
Rule 803. Justice Cleckley indicated that
[a]n extrajudicial statement offered for admission under the
state-of-mind exception of Rule 803(3) of the West Virginia Rules
of Evidence must also be tested under the relevancy requirements
of Rule 401 and Rule 402 of the Rules of Evidence. If the
declarant's state of mind is irrelevant to the resolution of the case,
the statement must be excluded.6
60 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
61 461 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1995).
62 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
6 3 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
6 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
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M Curative Admissibility Rule
Justice Cleckley addressed the curative admissibility rule in State v.
Guthrie.6 The opinion ruled that
[t]he curative admissibility rule allows a party to present otherwise
inadmissible evidence on an evidentiary point where an opponent
has "opened the door" by introducing similarly inadmissible
evidence on the same point. Under this rule, in order to be entitled
as a matter of right to present rebutting evidence on an evidentiary
fact: (a) The original evidence must be inadmissible and
prejudicial, (b) the rebuttal evidence must be similarly
inadmissible, and (c) the rebuttal evidence must be limited to the
same evidentiary fact as the original inadmissible evidence.66
N. Admitting Evidence of Insurance
In Reed v. Wimmer,67 Justice Cleckley created a narrow presumption of lack
of undue prejudice in admitting evidence of insurance in a case. The opinion held,
[a]n insured is presumed to be protected from undue prejudice
from the admission of evidence of insurance at trial if the
following requirements are met: (1) the evidence of insurance was
offered for a specific purpose other than to prove negligence or
wrongful conduct; (2) the evidence was relevant; (3) the trial court
made an on-the-record determination under Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence that the probative value of the evidence
was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice; and (4) the trial court delivered a limiting instruction
advising the jury of the specific purpose(s) for which the evidence
may be used.68
Reed also identified the issue of wrongful injection of insurance evidence
65 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
66 Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.
67 465 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1995).
68 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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at a trial. The opinion ruled that
[w]here evidence of insurance is wrongfully injected at a trial, its
prejudicial effect will be determined by applying the standard set
out in Rule 103(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. In
addition to the possibility that the jurors are already aware of the
existence of insurance, the trial court should consider the relative
strength of each of the parties case or the lack of it, whether the
jury was urged by counsel or the witness to consider insurance in
deciding the issue of negligence or damages, whether the injection
of insurance was designed to prejudice the jury, whether the
mention of insurance was in disregard of a previous order, and
whether a curative instruction can effectively dissipate any
resulting prejudice.69
0. Scientific Evidence
Admissibility of scientific evidence was addressed by Justice Cleckley in
Gentry v. Mangum.7" The following initial holding was made in the case:
The first and universal requirement for the admissibility of
scientific evidence is that the evidence must be both "reliable" and
"relevant." Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
and Wilt v. Buracker, the reliability requirement is met only by a
finding by the trial court under Rule 104(a) of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence that the scientific or technical theory which is
the basis for the test results is indeed "scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge." The trial court's determination regarding
whether the scientific evidence is properly the subject of scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge is a question of law that
we review de novo. On the other hand, the relevancy requirement
compels the trial judge to determine, under Rule 104(a), that the
scientific evidence "will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Appellate review of the
trial court's rulings under the relevancy requirement is under an
69 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
70 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
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abuse of discretion standard. State v. Beard.71
Gentry further ruled,
[w]hen scientific evidence is proffered, a circuit court in its
"gatekeeper" role under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. and Wilt v. Buracker must engage in a two-part analysis in
regard to the expert testimony. First, the circuit court must
determine whether the expert testimony reflects scientific
knowledge, whether the findings are derived by scientific method,
and whether the work product amounts to good science. Second,
the circuit court must ensure that the scientific testimony is
relevant to the task at hand.72
Justice Cleckley concluded in Gentry that
[t]he question of admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Wilt v. Buracker only arises if it is first
established that the testimony deals with "scientific knowledge."
"Scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science while "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation. In order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method. It is the circuit court's responsibility initially to
determine whether the expert's proposed testimony amounts to
"scientific knowledge" and, in doing so, to analyze not what the
experts say, but what basis they have for saying it.73
P. Excluding Witnesses Under Rule 615
The case of State v. Omechinski4 gave Justice Cleckley room to expound
upon the witness exclusion provision in Rule 615. It was said that "Rule 615 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence makes the exclusion of witnesses a matter of right,
71 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (citations omitted).
72 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (citations omitted).
73 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6 (citations omitted).
74 468 S.E.2d 173 (W. Va. 1996).
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and the decision is no longer committed to the trial court's discretion." T Moreover,
the opinion held that
[t]he purpose of Rule 615 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence
is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that
of another and to discourage fabrication and collusion. The rule
applies to rebuttal witnesses as well. It is not significant that the
rebuttal witness has or has not testified earlier in the
case-in-chief.76
Justice Cleckley held in Omechinski that "[a] circumvention of Rule 615
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence occurs where witnesses indirectly defeat its
purpose by discussing with other witnesses who are subject to recall testimony they
have given and events occurring in the courtroom."'77 The opinion highlights the
consequences of a trial court's failure to properly instruct excluded witnesses:
A failure to instruct the witnesses fully after Rule 615 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence is invoked may cause reversal. When
the Rule is invoked, the witnesses should be directed clearly that
they must all leave the courtroom, with the exceptions the rule
permits, and that they are not to discuss the case or what their
testimony has been or will be or what occurs in the courtroom with
anyone other than counsel for either side.78
It was also added that "[i]n criminal cases, when a trial court fails to comply with
Rule 615 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, prejudice is presumed and
reversal is required unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the error was harmless."79
Justice Cleckley added a caveat to a trial court's responsibility to instruct
excluded witnesses:
The rights granted under Rule 615 of the West Virginia Rules of
75 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
76 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
77 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
78 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
79 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
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Evidence are not self-executing. In the absence of a specific
request by the complaining party, a defendant may not claim error
as a result of the failure of the trial court to instruct witnesses as to
the impact of a sequestration order.80
The court ultimately held that
[i]n making a ruling whether to exclude a rebuttal witness's
testimony under Rule 615 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,
a trial court should consider several factors including: (1) how
critical the testimony in question is--that is, whether it involved
controverted and material facts; (2) whether the information
ordinarily is subject to tailoring such that cross-examination or
other evidence could bring to light any deficiencies; (3) to what
extent the testimony of the witness is likely to encompass the same
issues as other witnesses; (4) in what order the witness would
testify; and (5) if any potential for bias exists which may motivate
the witness to tailor his or her testimony."
Q. Witness Competency and the Dead Man's Statute
In Meadows v. Meadows, 2 Justice Cleckley took the opportunity to limit
the scope of the state's Dead Man's Statute on the testimony of an interested party.
The opinion held that
[w]here the competence of the maker of a testamentary document
is put in issue, the West Virginia Dead Man's Statute does not bar
a party or interested witness from testifying as to the deceased's
appearance and demeanor and the witness may give an opinion as
to the deceased's competency if the other prerequisites of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence are met. Thus, this Court's prior
decisions of Kuhn v. Shreeve and Freeman v. Freeman are
overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.83
so Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
81 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
82 468 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1996).
83 Id. at Syl. Pt. I (citations omitted).
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Meadows further held, "[w]hen communications between a deceased and a party or
interested witness are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but are merely
the basis for an opinion regarding the mental competency of the deceased, the party
or interested witness may use these communications to help explain the opinion.""
k Evidence of a Witness'Religion'
In State v. Potter," the court noted that "[i]f evidence of religion is offered
for purposes other than impairing or enhancing a witness's credibility, Rule 610 of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence does not require its exclusion. 86 Justice
Cleckley, in Potter, fashioned a test for determining whether evidence of a witness'
religious belief should be admitted:
For religious belief or affiliation evidence to be admissible, the
trial court must make the following findings: (1) the evidence of
religion is offered for a specific purpose other than to show
generally that the witness's credibility is impaired or enhanced; (2)
the evidence is relevant for that specific purpose; (3) the trial court
makes an on-the-record determination under Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence that the probative value of the evidence
was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice; and (4) the trial court, if requested, delivers an effective
limiting instruction advising the jury of the specific purpose(s) for
which the evidence may be used. If these elements are met, it may
be presumed that the complaining party was protected from undue
prejudice.87
S. Nonresponsive Answer
In State v. Crabtree,88 Justice Cleckley provided guidelines for addressing
nonreponsive answers by a witness:
84 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
85 478 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1996).
86 Id. at Syl. PL 4.
87 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
88 482 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1996).
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A witness should give responsive answers to questions of counsel,
and answers that are not responsive may be stricken on motion of
the examining party especially if the unresponsive answer contains
inadmissible evidence. Unresponsive answers, or those that are
responsive but broader than the question, should not be viewed as
the responsibility of the questioner. On the other hand, a
responsive answer, one that is reasonably within the scope of the
question, even though prejudicial, should not be stricken as
unresponsive. 9
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Interrogating a Suspect
The decision in State v. Farley9 confronted the issue of effectively
invoking Miranda rights. Justice Cleckley held that "[t]o assert the Miranda right
to terminate police interrogation, the words or conduct must be explicitly clear that
the suspect wishes to terminate all questioning and not merely a desire not to
comment on or answer a particular question." ' Farley creates a new test for trial
courts to use in determining whether a confession is valid. In overruling precedent,
Justice Cleckley wrote in Farley that
[r]epresentations or promises made to a defendant by one in
authority do not necessarily invalidate a subsequent confession. In
determining the voluntariness of a confession, the trial court must
assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. No one
factor is determinative. To the extent that State v. Parsons is
inconsistent with this standard, it is overruled.92
In State v. Bradshaw,' Justice Cleckley further refined the focus trial courts
must have in evaluating a confession. Bradshaw held that "[w]hen evaluating the
voluntariness of a confession, a determination must be made as to whether the
89 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
90 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994).
91 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
92 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7 (citation omitted).
93 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1995).
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